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13

therefore it was to be considered that each succeeding day added to our difficulties and I must beg the Courts attention to the circumstance. They were not difficulties that could be surmounted as will appear by a reference to a letter from Deputy Comy. General Gilman dated 5th. Sept. 1813 to Depy. Comy. Genl. Couche and also by his letter to me dated Montreal 7 June 1814 (No. 21) I felt the necessity of this document and therefore applied to him for it having lost all my Official communications on the Subject. One more trial was made to remain untill Seamen might arrive, at least until we might have a certainty of their being on their way, that failing only two alternatives remained either to join in the retreat of the Army after ingloriously burning my Vessels or risk an action notwithstanding the deplorable manner in which the Squadron was manned and if the Country was to fall it should not be without an effort on my part to prevent it -- Under such circumstances what Officer could hesitate a moment which measure he should adopt. I therefore instantly decided on that which appeared the most honorable and determined to risk everything rather than abandon my Post without a struggle and I was con- firmed in this resolution by General Proctors concurrence as expressed in his Letter of the 8th Sept here produced and the Court will perceive by extracts from letters from Sir George Prevost that in risking an Action at this critical period I only anticipated the express Orders of His Excellency who in a letter to General Proctor dated the 19 Sept. says that the Squadron on Lake Erie being inevitably involved in the Common Fate of the Military portion on Lake Erie is to be devoted to their preservation and if necessary sacrificed to the last Atom sooner than a vestage be left to swell the pride of an arrogant "Foe"

Having in my statement endeavoured to point out the numerous and accumulating difficulties that I laboured under in conjunction with the Army under Major General Proctor. I trust I have demonstrated the necess- ity of the Squadrons departure from Amherstberg. It is unnecessary for me to make any observations on the result of the Action as my Official Letter to Sir James Yeo on the subject is now before the Court, but I trust I may be permitted to make a few remarks on Sir James Yeo's letter and first oil that paragraph wherein he seems to doubt the existance of any scarcity that could justify my rieking an action. In answer to which I submit that if the Deputy Comr. General of an Army with such ample means as he had at his disposal was unable to procure any thing like an adequate supply for the Troops, can any one doubt the actual scarcity - That it did exist in an insurmountable degree is evident from the Comm- issarys Letters before refered to. I must next beg leave to point out the striking difference between Sir James Yeo's first Letter to Sir I. Warren and his second written after receiving my Official account of the Action a Copy of which letter I beg to produce No. which if I may judge from that circumstance he must have felt conscious that he had neglected to send me re-enforcements untill it was too late. My re- peated requests to him for this assistance may have irritated him and to save himself from censure he has endeavoured to through obloquy on me His observation that I appeared to have sailed under the conviction that I had every thing to gain and but little to lose Altho most true in the first part in one sense is evidently meant from the general Tenor of the